Just Reason by Hundleby, Catherine & Rooney, Phyllis
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
Philosophy Publications Department of Philosophy
2010
Just Reason
Catherine Hundleby
University of Windsor
Phyllis Rooney
Oakland University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/philosophypub
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Philosophy Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact
scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Recommended Citation
Hundleby, Catherine and Rooney, Phyllis. (2010). Just Reason. Studies in Social Justice, 4, 1-6.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/philosophypub/7
Studies in Social Justice 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 1-6, 2010 
 
 
 
Correspondence Addresses: Catherine E. Hundleby, Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor, 
Windsor, ON N9B 3P4 Canada. Tel: +1 519 253-3000 x 3947, Email: hundleby@uwindsor.ca 
Phyllis Rooney, Department of Philosophy, Oakland University, Rochester, MI, 48309-4401, USA. Tel: 
+1 248 370-3390, Email: rooney@oakland.edu 
 
ISSN: 1911-4788 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Just Reason 
 
CATHERINE E. HUNDLEBY  
Department of Philosophy, and Women’s Studies Program, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, 
Canada  
 
PHYLLIS ROONEY  
Department of Philosophy, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA 
 
 
 
During significant periods of the history of Western philosophy, the pursuit of 
epistemic goods such as reason, truth, and knowledge was considered quite distinct 
from the pursuit of moral and political values such as goodness, rightness, and 
justice. Knowledge was often theorized as the product of universal norms of reason 
and unbiased observation, that is, untainted by individual interests or by cultural or 
political values. During these past centuries (since the Scientific Revolution 
especially) epistemologists and philosophers of science have regularly taken 
scientific knowledge as their model of epistemic achievement in theorizing 
conceptions and ideals of reason and knowledge. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, logical empiricists distinguished 
meaningful scientific knowledge from value claims, and yet in the early years of the 
Vienna Circle some of its members emphasized the role of science in the political 
project of making the world a better place (Okruhlik, 2004). In the latter decades of 
the twentieth century the traditional distinctions between science and values and 
between reason and justice came under more thorough critical scrutiny. In particular, 
Thomas Kuhn's (1962) Structure of Scientific Revolutions provided the catalyst for 
significant philosophical work examining the role of historical, social, cultural, and 
political values in the development of scientific knowledge. Two decades later, 
Genevieve Lloyd's (1984) Man of Reason set the stage for feminist examinations of 
the ways in which philosophical ideals of reason encompassed male norms and 
associations, often through the explicit devaluation of female or “feminine” traits or 
experiences (cited in Rooney, 1994).  
As work in feminist or, as it is now sometimes called, liberatory epistemology has 
continued to show, traditional ideals of reason and knowledge regularly 
accommodate, if not reinforce, unjust social divisions, particularly those relating to 
gender, race, and class (Alcoff & Potter, 1993; Sullivan & Tuana, 2007). In 
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consequence, feminist and liberatory epistemological work is centrally concerned 
with motivating accounts of reason and knowledge (including scientific knowledge) 
that make visible social inequities among reasoners and knowers, something that 
traditional accounts of a universal, transhistorical, disembodied Reason fail to do. 
This visibility and critical attention is considered necessary to the development of 
accounts of “just reason.” Such accounts of reason and reasoning underwrite 
concepts and theories of social justice that explicitly aim toward meaningful social 
progress in a world still significantly constrained by unequal access to social and 
political goods.  
In challenging the traditional philosophical segregation of reason and knowledge 
from politics, feminist and liberatory epistemologists are not suggesting that 
knowledge reduces to a political contest. They argue, instead, that understandings of 
reason and knowledge need to engage more constructively with the ethical and social 
specificities that frame scientific and other knowledge projects, including social and 
political knowledge projects that explicitly seek to advance social justice. In 
particular, such understandings draw attention to the fact that the ways in which 
theorists conceptualize, think, or reason about social and political issues have 
regularly given voice to specific perspectives over others, thus limiting opportunities 
for insight and resolution. All of the papers and the book review in this volume 
advance “just reason” in this way: they give reason and voice to concepts, views, or 
perspectives that have usually not been included in standard debates about particular 
social and political issues. These issues include identity politics in multicultural 
societies (Mason), discourses about war and violence (Stone-Mediatore), debates 
about same-sex marriage (Jaarsma), the role of consciousness-raising in meaningful 
social change (Fischer), and the recognition of indigenous knowledges and epistemes 
in the academic institutions of the global North (Lange on Kuokkanen).  
New or previously disregarded concepts and voices show us ways to provide more 
adequate reasoning about social justice. In “Reorienting Deliberation: Identity 
Politics in Multicultural Societies,” Rebecca Mason argues that in debates about 
identity politics rights discourse is not sufficient to address the concerns of non-
dominant cultures. The perspective that Shari Stone-Mediatore urges we consider is 
the anti-war perspective of many families of slain and wounded soldiers. In 
“Epistemologies of Discomfort: What Military-Family Anti-War Activists Can 
Teach Us About Knowledge of Violence,” she reveals the inadequacy of standard 
but distant political expertise that claims neutrality. The perspective that Ada 
Jaarsma challenges in “Rethinking the Secular in Feminist Marriage Debates” is 
shared by feminists and liberatory thinkers on both sides of the same-sex marriage 
debate, as well as right-wing opponents to same-sex marriage. That perspective rests 
on the uncritical assumption of a divide between the secular and the religious, and it 
thus fails to recognize that the religious-secular divide is a politically loaded 
distinction that requires contextualized critical appraisal. The development of 
progressive forms of understanding at the level of the knowing individual or self is 
the subject of Clara Fischer's “Consciousness and Conscience: Feminism, 
Pragmatism, and the Potential for Radical Change.” Fischer views consciousness-
raising as significant in the development of new cognitive practices that are 
necessary for sustained social change, something that many accounts of social 
change overlook.  
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Mason's apologia for identity politics employs the notion of “horizons of 
intelligibility” borrowed from Linda Alcoff. Horizons of intelligibility are contexts 
for reasoning in which one can situate oneself relative to social identities, and this 
approach demonstrates an alternative to the rights-based view of what it means to 
appeal to a social identity. Mason maintains that attention to identity, understood as 
rational placement regarding a horizon of intelligibility, aids the recognition of each 
other’s guiding reasons and values and thus provides a basis for communication 
across sociocultural differences. She argues that such an understanding of identity 
challenges Jeremy Waldron's account of identity politics understood largely in terms 
of rights claims or demands. Identity politics “ground both claims for redistribution 
and recognition” (p. 8), Mason acknowledges, but they need not be the obstacle to 
deliberation that Waldron claims, but rather can be a resource for understanding and 
deliberation. Waldron's formulation of identity politics as a rights claim obscures the 
relationship between cultural identity and reasoning that Alcoff's view illuminates 
because it treats identity as a starting point for reasoning.  
Stone-Mediatore argues that “responsible thinking about institutionalized violence, 
including war, demands a distinctive kind of thinking-within-discomfort for which 
conventionally trained public-affairs experts are ill-suited and for which undervalued 
epistemic traits play a crucial role” (p. 26). Academic and professional expertise, 
along with the epistemic authority that expertise garners and on which it depends, 
shields reasoners from fully understanding the causes and effects of routine social 
violence. The institutionalized violence that concerns Stone-Mediatore is severe and 
systemic and “results . . . from established social and political institutions that 
systematically offend human dignity, or systematically deprive certain people of the 
conditions necessary for physical and mental integrity” (p. 30). She maintains that 
contemporary North American understandings of war reveal deep problems with the 
ideal of rationality as detachment. “Although typical of political discourse, their 
construction-project and law-and-order metaphors have little relation to the insecure 
and chaotic reality of war” (p. 35). The expertise of Michael Ignatieff and Fouad 
Ajami, in particular, “demonstrate[s] greater commitment to neoliberal and neo-
colonialist discourses than to the complexity of the situation on the ground” (p. 35).  
Current feminist disagreements in the U.S. over same-sex marriage can be traced 
to two strands in feminist theory, Jaarsma argues. On the one hand, discourse theory 
supports a version of liberal feminism that seeks access to marriage for gays and 
lesbians and promotes other types of marriage reform. Seeking legal reform makes 
sense given that discourse ethics employs communicative rationality as the means to 
democratic justice. The results of reform are less promising from the perspective of 
queer theory feminists who suspect the exclusionary nature of marriage, citing its 
sexist and racist heritage; they suggest instead that we need deeper rethinking of the 
nature of larger legal structures relating to citizenship. Establishing clear targets for 
discourse reform is difficult because of the problem of distinguishing the rational 
from the patriarchal elements of discourse, and that entails, in the United States 
especially, a need to question the divide between religious culture and the secular 
state. Marriage itself has religious origins and is not morally neutral.  
Jaarsma argues that we must embrace cognitive dissonance as a general virtue of 
liberatory reasoning. The feminist debates over same-sex marriage reveal a 
pernicious assumption that the religious and the secular have clear mutual 
boundaries, whereas in fact negotiating this divide involves self-creation. Not only 
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religion but secularism too has a specific history with its own paradoxes. Instead of 
appealing to secularism, she advocates a post-secular turn in which liberatory 
thinkers accept the dissonance among our various ethical commitments.  
Whereas Jaarsma treats political commitments as existential leaps, Clara Fischer 
views our ability to transform ourselves as a gradual matter of acquiring Deweyan 
habits: “For Dewey, we are constantly faced with a choice between acting in 
accordance with the old, static self, or with the new, dynamic self” (p. 71). Fischer 
applies the pragmatist framework of John Dewey to understand how personal moral 
change that provides the basis for political change is possible because of the self-
reflexive aspects of human reasoning. Knowledge depends on an engagement with 
the world that is motivated by uncertainty, yet having knowledge remains dynamic 
because “uncertainty results from the conversion process and characterizes one's 
existence as a feminist” (p. 79). Emphasizing the dynamic aspect of the self implies 
not simply change but moral progress. This Deweyan morality of ongoing personal 
transformation complements Jaarsma's prescription of dynamic embodied 
engagement. However, Fischer’s attention to the individual reveals problems with 
sudden epiphanic accounts of coming to feminist consciousness, and she argues that 
such personal, political, and moral changes accrete slowly. It is the longstanding 
strength of gradually engrained Deweyan habits that provides for ongoing feminist 
resolve, although feminists also rely on feminist communities of approvers and 
reprimanders to establish those habits.  
Social justice relates to reason in specific ways in each article. Mason's move away 
from the language of rights allows individual understanding and reasoning a role in 
identity politics, and thus in addressing social injustice. She acknowledges the 
importance of Waldron's concern with human rights, which is part of the terminology 
of the established dialogue for addressing social justice issues. However, Mason 
argues that the language of rights only provides a starting place for civic reasoning 
based in identity politics. Civic deliberation is an open-ended process rather than a 
matter of compromise among pre-defined rights. 
For Stone-Mediatore, attention to those who directly suffer from its social injustice 
aids reasoning about institutionalized violence. “Personal ties to war, when 
combined with a concern for honesty about the world that homes loved ones, can 
help [people] to face vexing realities, even when this exposes them to intellectual 
uncertainty and social ostracization” (p. 38). Understanding the phenomena of war 
for Stone-Mediatore depends on recognizing the limits of abstract thinking and its 
tendency to distract us from the concrete human historical details of war.  
Creating social justice is entwined with a changing self according to both Jaarsma 
and Fischer. For Jaarsma, the sorts of rational and political conflicts that emerge in 
anyone's life can be seen writ large in the feminist debates over same-sex marriage. 
The lesson to be learned is that our personal compromises among forms of justice 
and demands of rationality constitute ourselves as particular moral and rational 
beings.  
For Fischer, personal transformation is a layered and recursive process moving 
with and against past habits and surrounding communities. Thus, achieving social 
justice in our communities requires pressing ourselves to change, but personal 
transformation and progress also depend on engagement with communities of like-
minded people. 
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Reasoning that is socially just but also evolving is the issue in Rebecca 
Kuokkanen's book, Reshaping the University: Responsibility, Indigenous Epistemes, 
and the Logic of the Gift, reviewed in this issue by Lynda Lange. Kuokkanen argues 
that the university suffers from viewing knowledge in terms of exchange rather than 
giving. This view of reasoning must change if the academy is to cease marginalizing 
and silencing indigenous peoples. Kuokkanen proposes that universities adopt an 
alternative “gift logic” that is notable in indigenous cultures and that draws on 
virtues of respect, responsibility, and reciprocity. “The marginalization of indigenous 
peoples is not (only) a question of racism or ethnic minority rights, but it is a 
marginalization of peoples with rights to self-determination” (p. 89), as Lange 
explains. Kuokkanen does not idealize indigenous cultures for being more virtuous, 
but she argues that they offer valuable alternative conceptions that will continue to 
develop. Only one of the benefits of an academy with a “gift logic” is greater 
inclusion of indigenous reasoners themselves. 
In sum, just reason shows us social justice as a process of reasoning (among other 
things). It is a way of positioning ourselves for democratic engagement (Mason); it 
motivates reasoning about the changing material details of institutionalized violence 
(Stone-Mediatore), or about the contingencies of the very concepts we employ 
(Jaarsma); it requires self-transformation as we aim to reason justly (Fischer); and it 
draws attention to considerations of the cognitive resources that can be found in 
indigenous cultures, which will encourage the fuller participation of indigenous 
peoples in academic and political institutions (Kuokkanen, Lange). As all of these 
papers show, bringing about the changes in ourselves and the world that genuinely 
support greater social justice depends on just reason in the form of flexible and 
strategic reasoning from a variety of perspectives. 
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